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A B S T R A C T
We are failing to protect the biosphere. Novel views of conservation, preservation, and sustainability are surfacing in the wake of consensus about our failures to
prevent extinction or slow climate change. We argue that the interests and well-being of non-humans, youth, and future generations of both human and non-human
beings (futurity) have too long been ignored in consensus-based, anthropocentric conservation. Consensus-based stakeholder-driven processes disadvantage those
absent or without a voice and allow current adult humans and narrow, exploitative interests to dominate decisions about the use of nature over its preservation for
futurity of all life. We propose that authentically non-anthropocentric worldviews that incorporate multispecies justice are needed for a legitimate, deliberative, and
truly democratic process of adjudication between competing interests in balancing the preservation and use of nature. Legitimate arenas for such adjudication would
be courts that can defend intergenerational equity, which is envisioned by many nations' constitutions, and can consider current and future generations of non-human
life. We urge practitioners and scholars to disavow implicit anthropocentric value judgments in their work – or make these transparent and explicit – and embrace a
more comprehensive worldview that grants future life on earth fair representation in humanity's decisions and actions today.
1. Introduction
Global climate change and the ongoing human-induced mass ex-
tinction now imperil all life on Earth (Ceballos and Ehrlich, 2018;
Ceballos et al., 2015; Ripple et al., 2017), including current human
health and future human well-being (Blumm and Wood, 2017; Patz and
Hatch, 2014). It is time to consider whether the 30-year-old practice
and scholarship of biodiversity conservation has failed.
We propose a hypothesis that current biodiversity conservation
failed by compromising on anthropocentric exploitation of nature and
by aligning with narrow interest groups rather than the broadest group
of future generations. The current trends in loss of non-human life go
well beyond our current sixth mass-extinction event (Barnosky et al.,
2011; Ceballos et al., 2015), to include massive declines in wilderness
areas (Watson et al., 2016) and population losses in what has been
appropriately described as the “biological annihilation” of the non-
human world (Ceballos et al., 2017). To reverse this environmental and
moral catastrophe, we propose a fundamental re-imagining of what
nature protection ought to mean and with it we reintroduce the term
preservation.
Since its beginnings, the field of conservation biology has been in a
muddle over the place of individual non-human animals and future
generations. Founders of conservation biology like Michael Soulé pre-
supposed the intrinsic value – value for itself – of biological diversity
based on the evolutionary-ecological inheritance that today's
biodiversity represents (Soulé, 1985). In addition to focusing on eco-
logical wholes (e.g., populations, species), the postulates of conserva-
tion biology generally subordinate individual animals to human in-
strumental and ecological values (Callicott, 1997; Groom et al., 2007;
Hutchins, 2008; Meffe and Carroll, 1997; Soulé, 1985). This is not from
a lack of compassion for individual animals, but an embrace of (or re-
sistance to) an ecocentric (ecosystems focused) interpretation of in-
trinsic value as a settled axiom of conservation with less ethical at-
tention given to individual animals in conservation (Bekoff, 2013;
Bruskotter et al., 2017; Orr, 2006; Santiago-Ávila et al., 2018; Soulé,
2014; Vucetich et al., 2015). The consequence we see today is that
conservation biology and its ethics remain confused about whether we
have responsibilities to individual organisms, how we should meet
those responsibilities, and what an inheritance of evolutionary out-
comes implies. Nor does conservation biology adequately emphasize
the importance of preserving nature (as opposed to conserving natural
resources) for future generations of humans and non-humans. As a re-
sult, we conclude the field matured with an inadequate, muddled ethic
in these respects. That disjointed ethic allows for compromises that
place such a high value on most current (and increasingly trivial)
human interests derived from destructive activities that the needs and
interests of non-human nature are effectively dismissed (Doak et al.,
2014; Mathews, 2016; Godet and DeVictor, 2018). Here we try to dis-
entangle the muddle and fill the gaps.
Although we appreciate recent efforts to integrate social justice into
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T
conservation or clarify how non-anthropocentric ecological justice is
more fair than anthropocentric environmental justice, we believe they
do not go far enough in fixing the muddle summarized above. We offer
a stronger, clearer interpretation of non-anthropocentrism than
Vucetich et al. (2018), and a stronger clearer rationale for ethical
consideration of individual organisms than Washington et al. (2018),
while avoiding the unjustified localism and narrow interest group af-
finities of their critics (Pooley and Redpath, 2018; Redpath et al.,
2017). While we agree that non-anthropocentric interests have been
marginalized in practice and scholarship about protecting nature, we
find recent interpretations of a non-anthropocentric principle continue
to side-line the well-being of the non-human world and contain a
vexing speciesism (creating a hierarchy of value with humans at the top
and justifying human use of individual non-humans as long as popu-
lations, habitats, or ecological assemblages remain apparently un-
harmed). We also agree that decisions about the use of nature should
emerge within a deliberative democratic framework, such as an ad-
judication between advocates. Yet, we argue that both the principles
and process envisioned would remain flawed if the substantive interests
of non-humans, youth, and futurity continue to be subordinated to
current adult human generations. We also emphasize that decisions
about the use of nature should emerge from a more deliberative and
representative process than is common today (López-Bao et al., 2017), a
process that should give full voice to the range of interests that have a
stake in the environment. This requires that youth and futurity (future
generations of both human and non-human beings) have direct re-
presentation in the deliberative adjudication process (Attfield, 1998;
Cooper and Palmer, 1995; Underwood, 1994). Claims made about
protecting the future by maximizing wealth today seem thin and un-
persuasive rebuttals of our argument for proper representations of the
interests of youth and futurity, given the ecosystem collapses im-
pending worldwide overseen by current adults, and the evident dis-
counting of debts we now incur that futurity must inevitably pay.
Among the beneficiaries of nature, many currently disenfranchised
human generations have a legal right to an unimpaired healthy en-
vironment preserved for the future, overseen by prudent, accountable
trustees in a majority of nations and we argue planet-wide (Treves
et al., 2018). Human rights to a healthy environment may be sub-
stantive (i.e., citizens have a right to a healthy environment) in many
countries' constitutions (Boyd, 2013), or procedural (e.g., the rights to
information, to participate in decision-making, to access the judicial
system “to challenge government decisions, unconstitutional laws or
alleged violations of individual rights” (p. 16, following Boyd (2013)).
A large proportion of countries also have government duties to protect a
healthy environment (Boyd, 2011, 2013), which for our present context
implies a procedural right to challenge the government if it fails in that
duty. Other beneficiaries of the planetary environment and the evolu-
tionary outcomes bequeathed on all life, include current and future
non-human organisms. The current human blindness to the intrinsic
value of non-human life evident in law, policy, thought, and behavior
do not make it just. Difficulties we face in imagining such a justice
system do not make it impossible. Because the decisions we make to use
nature and the actions that follow such decisions affect all life on Earth,
our legal and political systems routinely grapple with the ethics and
justice of destruction. So should they grapple with the ethics and justice
of preserving nature. Here we present a path to just preservation.
We propose that at a minimum, current adults have an ethical duty
to equitably consider the interests of those voiceless in the political
process, youth, non-humans, and futurity of all life. Articulation of
specific legal rights of the voiceless is beyond our scope at present
because the ethical duty – to fully consider the interests of the voiceless
youth, non-humans, and futurity – is strong enough to justify the ar-
guments here. But we do wish to make clear that even the three authors
here find themselves occupying slightly different positions along a
spectrum describing the rights of youth, non-humans, and futurity.
Namely, we three do not occupy extreme positions asserting axiomatic
rights for non-humans that are equal to those rights attributed to all
humans (which are themselves subject to controversy, of course), nor at
the other extreme of denying any rights to non-humans. One of us
would argue that the ethical duty is a powerful, moral imperative to
consider fully the interests of non-humans in light of their capabilities
and needs with flexibility derived from thorough, just deliberation on
all interests relative to each situation. One of us would argue for a
procedural right for non-humans to be fairly represented and have
automatic legal standing in judicial decisions about the balance of
preserving and using nature. One of us would argue for substantive
rights of non-humans that might be considered equitably alongside the
rights enjoyed by humans contingent on context. Fuller treatment is
beyond our scope and unnecessary for our present purpose, which is to
argue for the premise that current adults have a duty to consider the
interests of youth and non-humans more thoroughly and fairly, with a
clearer non-anthropocentric ethic for preserving nature and a just, le-
gitimate process for that ethic to be heard.
The unifying theme behind our worldview is that future life on
Earth depends on humanity rejecting first the self-serving arguments of
current user groups, and second all forms of anthropocentrism, and
instead embracing a focus on preserving the planet for future life.
Box
Glossary essential to integrating ethics in conservation practice and
scholarship.
Five terms demand clarification. First, we see ‘conservation’ as
rooted in wise use philosophies, which we argue have been
less wise and more use – and are indelibly associated with
anthropocentric instrumental views of non-human nature.
Therefore, we use ‘preservation’ to mean ‘save for the future’
and reject a caricature of preservation as meaning ‘to store
untouched or in a permanent state’. One virtue of the term
preservation is that it is both clearer in meaning and more
resistant to co-opting by users who care little for the protec-
tion of people, animals, and their environments.
Second, by ‘animal’ we focus on wildlife though not to the
exclusion of other living beings that we include as ‘nature’,
and we mean animals and nature considered as individuals
and as groups (such as populations and species in ecological or
social communities). Our understanding of animals is rapidly
changing in response to better knowledge from animal ethics
and science.
Third, by ‘futurity’ we mean future generations of the en-
tire community of life – individuals and communities, human
and non-human, socially and ecologically related. Here we are
expanding the usual meaning of the term as it is frequently
complicit with speciesist restrictions on our concerns for none
but future human beings. What comes along with this a vision
of thorough-going sustainability that seeks to preserve the
entire community of life into perpetuity.
Fourth, we use the phrase ‘just preservation’ not only to
represent a critique of the conservation focus on current adult
humans generally, but to note the strong resonance between
recent proposals and alternative, anthropocentric-heavy
paradigms of conservation like ‘new conservation,’ (Kareiva,
2014; Marvier and Kareiva, 2014), ‘social nature,’ (Castree
and Braun, 2001), and the ‘Anthropocene’ (Crutzen, 2006).
These remain shallow ecological worldviews with techno-
centric overtones, their affinities with human exceptionalism
too strong to be ignored, and their potential to help solve the
plight of the planet too weak to endorse (Eckersley, 1992;
Naess, 1973, 1989; O'Riordan, 1989).
Fifth, we use speciesism for any ethical, legal, or political
reasoning that provides cover for human exceptionalism of
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any sort, such as dominionism (the earth was created for
human use), anthropocentrism (intrinsic value is a property of
human beings alone), and varieties of ecocentrism that privi-
lege the interests of human beings while inconsistently redu-
cing other sentient, sapient, and social animals to biological
machines, functional units of ecosystems, and resources for
our use and abuse.
2. Integrating justice and preservation for the future
Recent proposals for new paradigms in conservation have not shied
away from advocating for some form of non-anthropocentrism. For
example, Vucetich et al.'s (2018) concept of ‘just conservation’ seems to
seek to combine social justice and conservation with an eye towards fair
and sustainable development. For example, they define social justice as
“the fair treatment of others, where fairness is judged according to well-
reasoned application of three principles: equality, need, and desert
(noun form of deserve).” (p. 23–24, Vucetich et al., 2018). A central
ethical principle is “the principle of non-anthropocentrism” (NA). De-
signed to enshrine the intrinsic value of at least some components of
nature, it states that, “No human should infringe on the well-being of
others any more than is necessary for a healthy, meaningful life.” (p. 28,
Vucetich et al., 2018). Their NA principle above is combined with a
“safeguard principle”, seemingly aimed at ensuring social justice is not
sacrificed in the interest of conservation. That safeguard principle
states:
“If a significant and genuine conservation interest calls for re-
stricting a human interest, that restriction should occur except when
doing so would result in injustice. When the restriction would be
unjust every effort should be made by all involved parties to miti-
gate the restriction to the point of no longer being unjust.”
(p. 30, Vucetich et al., 2018)
Whatever one's position on the existence and meaning of intrinsic
value, or the requirements for authentic justice, their principles of NA
and safeguard initially might appear unproblematic to some, and to
others as a good marriage between conservation and development. The
well-being of humans and some other beings is acknowledged and not
immediately reduced to property or resources. Social justice is also a
well-understood value of society, despite differences in the political
philosophies and individual versus collective interests that define what
social justice is and how best to bring it about. So if people and at least
some other beings have intrinsic value, and conservationists keep their
eye on both, then hypothetically these principles might well help bring
them into balance.
3. Speciesism and misanthropy
Were such proposals a straightforward recognition and balancing of
the intrinsic value and well-being of people, animals, and nature, we
would have little objection. Indeed, it would be entirely preferable to
both “new conservation” and “social nature” with their self-privileging
of humans alone in the name of conservation and political ecology,
respectively (Crist, 2004; Johns, 2014; Soulé, 1995, 2014). Yet this is
usually not the case. For example, Vucetich et al.'s (2018) claim of non-
anthropocentrism (NA) is directly belied by a qualification that effec-
tively turns over the table on their principle. It reads: “While the NA
principle is unequivocally non-anthropocentric, it prioritizes human
well-being” (p. 28, Vucetich et al., 2018). The logic behind this quali-
fication is commonplace and used often when discussing the well-being
of animal lives. As noted by Mary Midgley (1998), there are two ways
of dismissing animals in moral and political discourse. One is an out-
right rejection of the intrinsic value of non-human beings, what she
calls “absolute dismissal” and is associated with “hard”
anthropocentrism, as in a hardened prejudice against non-human
creatures. But there is another form of dismissal, what she terms “re-
lative dismissal” where the intrinsic value of at least some animal lives
is partially acknowledged but their interests are placed firmly behind
those of human beings (Midgley, 1998). This is still a prejudice based
on species even if it is more amiable. Vucetich et al. (2018) have thus
reconstituted, perhaps unintentionally, a “soft” anthropocentrism. Yet
because they do embrace the intrinsic value of animals and nature, we
hasten to point out that their current position is quite different from
“weak anthropocentrism.” This is a form of hard anthropocentrism/
speciesism that dismisses the intrinsic value of animals and nature al-
together. As such it serves to blinker our moral vision so that only those
ecological processes and services of instrumental value to human beings
are considered as necessary in conservation ethics (Norton, 1984).
This is further underscored by the claim that those who do not ac-
cept the absolute priority of human well-being and social justice, as
embodied in the safeguard principle – are misanthropists. Labeling such
a response as misanthropic is a non-sequiter. As Vucetich and colleagues
themselves point out in another article:
“Caring for non-humans, for their own sake, does not preclude
caring for humans. Humans are more than capable of caring for
many more than one kind of thing. Reasoning to the contrary might
also be used to support the belief that honoring one's ethnicity is
fundamentally incompatible with racial equality. These considera-
tions indicate that nothing is inherently misanthropic about being
non-anthropocentric.”
(Vucetich et al., 2015)
Ethical impartiality requires the well-being of all – people, animals,
and nature – be equitably considered simultaneously, and the well-
being of both humans and non-humans can certainly be considered and
implemented alongside one another. It cannot be considered an affront
to humans to acknowledge the entitlements of animals, just as it cannot
be considered an affront to the wealthy to protect the entitlements of
low-income communities. In human affairs this is true even if this
translates into measures to reallocate resources or prioritize policies
that focus on increasing the well-being of the least well-off and re-
stricting the interests of the wealthy. So too doing right by other ani-
mals and futurity may mean reallocating resources and prioritizing
policies that at times optimizes the well-being of non-human others.
Speciesism also undermines a claim for authentic justice when de-
liberating on the preservation and use of nature. An interpretation of
non-anthropocentrism that assumes an a priori hierarchy of one species
over another, rather than in a contextual analysis of the morally-re-
levant capabilities and claims of the individuals (human and non-
human) involved (Nussbaum, 2004) seems speciesist to us. Vucetich
et al. (2018) do not present their reasoning for how or why human well-
being should always take priority. They seem to treat preference for
humans as an unvoiced and axiomatic presupposition to their argu-
ment. That unvoiced axiom is assisted by loose use of the term ‘mis-
anthropy’ which they did not define. Therefore, we read their use of
misanthropy as any disagreement with human priority. Terms like
misanthropy carry implications for how we conceptualize and act on
justice towards other species (Singer, 2000). We are concerned that a
discriminatory preference for one's own over another's species in all
matters cannot be regarded as justice (Singer, 2000). Impartiality
should preclude the establishment of a human-non-human hierarchical
dichotomy that unquestionably places human above non-human well-
being without first considering the particulars of each ethical situation
and the claims involved. It seems difficult to argue that anything less
than this equitable treatment could be considered impartial or just.
4. Multispecies justice for animals and futurity
An ethic of justice establishes baseline duties we have towards other
community members given their capabilities, needs and relationships,
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meaning that justice is often understood as an ethical duty we owe
towards other selves as centers of experience. There is thus a tension
that arises between those advancing justice for individual beings, and
those embracing justice for ecological aggregates or the geosphere. As
individual authors, we are still in dialogue with each other and our
epistemic communities over where the emphasis should lie (Lynn,
1998a; Midgley, 2001; Plumwood, 2000; Regan, 2004; Washington
et al., 2018). Nonetheless, we insist that any conceptualization of
multispecies justice must incorporate justice towards individual non-
humans. Whatever else it might be, justice is about being in right re-
lationship with others, individually and collectively, rather than con-
cepts or things. We consider justice for these collectives precisely be-
cause they contain selves.
We consider that justice should be extended to non-human moral
subjects according to their capabilities and relationships rather than
merely their species. The capabilities approach sees animal well-being
as a matter of justice as well as compassion, and such justice is founded
on the species-specific capacities of animals to flourish according to
their kind (Nussbaum, 2011). Depending on the species, this involves
matters of physical and/or psychological integrity, emotional and
cognitive functions, social affiliations with others, and ecological in-
terrelationships. Fulfilling minimal thresholds of these capacities is
necessary for any being to live a dignified life and to be treated justly
(Nussbaum, 2011, 2016). Moreover, justice as usually defined (and
adequately in our view) prioritizes no criteria of group or species
membership to adjudicate fair treatment. That is not to say we do not
believe these criteria to be relevant in ethical considerations, but they
are so because they inform the types of capabilities, interests, and thus
claims that a being may have on others (Midgley, 1998; Nussbaum,
2011).
Prioritizing human well-being simply substitutes what is usually
seen as a near-absolute dismissal of non-human animal claims for what
could be considered a less blatant, ‘relative’ dismissal still subordinated
to humans (Midgley, 1998). We are merely highlighting how certain
non-anthropocentric views could be construed as soft anthropocentrism
and speciesism because humans are still placed on top or at the center.
A consequence of embracing these views is a risk that we slip towards
preferring human interests, no matter how trivial, whenever humans
and non-humans interests conflict. For example, there is a trend in the
literature on poaching arguing that poaching a few animals helps the
surviving animals' population (reviewed and criticized by Chapron and
Treves (2017), Epstein (2017), Epstein and Chapron (2018)), or that
poaching is a release valve that would otherwise blow off steam by
eradication of the poached species (Kaltenborn and Brainerd, 2016).
Killing a non-human so a human feels better or does not start a killing
spree appears to us as examples of trivial and amoral human desires far
from vital or well-being needs.
Speciesism in favor of humans subordinates all life to human whims.
Subordination of claims based on group membership is certainly not the
case in situations concerning other vulnerable moral subjects, such as
differently-abled humans or children. The vulnerability of such groups
places additional duties on the majority or powerful. For example, the
ethical principles of autonomy, beneficence, non-malfeasance, and
justice are commonly recognized in the case of protected classes or
vulnerable humans and communities in health-care and medical ethics
(Beauchamp and Childress, 2013; Jonsen et al., 1997). Attention to
vulnerability and capability is a central element of many well-grounded
theories of justice (Nussbaum, 2011; Rawls, 2009). For example, there
could very well be a focus on the situation of the least well-off, which
would allow for inequalities in outcomes that would benefit, or at least
not harm, those individuals (Nussbaum, 2011; Rawls, 2009). Clearly,
non-humans would often fall in this protected class or vulnerable ca-
tegory when faced with human exploitation.
We acknowledge that there may at times be a human preference for
human well-being based on shared experiences, mutual interests, or
emotional bonds (Midgley, 1998). These special ethical considerations
can be seen as similar to the moral preference we give to those closest to
us, based on social bonds or acquired duties (Midgley, 1998; Regan,
2004). Yet, neither of these special considerations limits us to the
species boundary. This bonding is not exclusive; it should not dismiss
non-human others from consideration and the extension of moral du-
ties. The key to resolving ethical arguments is in evaluating the merits
of the conflicting claims involved, and considering the capabilities and
relationships of individuals is critical in these situations (Midgley,
1998). Claims of the communities we belong to may be strong, but (1)
they are not the only strong ones (they are neither sole nor supreme
(Midgley, 1998)), and (2) the understanding of a purely ‘human com-
munity’ rather than a ‘mixed-community’ of species is a fiction not
shared globally (David, 2009; Midgley, 1998; Plumwood, 2000).
Our conceptualization of an adequately horizontal rather than
hierarchical approach would position human well-being alongside, not
in front or before, non-human well-being. Hence, it would argue for
extending justice to non-human (in addition to human) claims if pre-
servation is to be truly non-anthropocentric. While we completely agree
with most conservationists that extreme inequality in the distribution of
wealth is of paramount concern, we would like to highlight that, if
actually considering the well-being of non-humans, they should be
considered as well within this injustice, and their entitlements should
be equitably considered and safeguarded (through, for example, the
extension of Vucetich et al.'s (2018) ‘safeguard principle’).
Axiomatic approaches to conservation ethics treat principles like
absolute truth and apply it to problems in a top down manner. Yet
questions of conservation (and public policy more generally) are too
complex and nuanced to admit such brittle analysis. Conservation
ethics require a more interpretive approach that sees principles as rules
of thumb that deliver moral insights useful to thought and action (Lynn,
2006; Midgley, 1998; Orr, 2006; Toulmin and Jonsen, 1998). This
means more than one or two principles may be relevant to any parti-
cular situation and a pluralistic approach matching moral insights to
particular cases would be required (Bernard, 2016; Plumwood, 2000;
Stone, 1988). The following ethical principles are examples of this
pluralism and speak to our own presuppositions about just preserva-
tion. Geocentrism (Lynn, 1998b) recognizes the intrinsic value of people,
animals, and nature as individuals and social-ecological communities.
Equitable consideration (Singer, 2000) wherein we ought to take into
account the interests and well-being of humans, animals, and their
environments, and weigh these equally in ethical reasoning. Inter-
generational equity (Cooper and Palmer, 1995; Weiss, 1984) seeks fair-
ness between generations, and in our interpretation includes future
people, animals, and nature alike. Bioproportionality (Mathews, 2016)
that would equitably partition planetary resources among species (not
only wealth among humans).
In sum, anything less than fairly balancing the well-being of humans
and non-humans, now and into the future, would be anthropocentric
and unjust. During the final stages of revision of this article, an im-
portant analysis by Washington and colleagues (Washington et al.,
2018) was published in this journal. It promoted ecological justice
distinct from both social justice and its “offshoot” (p. 369) of environ-
mental justice, because these two schools of thought and practice ex-
press anthropocentric worldviews that do and will irrevocably discount
the interests of non-human nature. We agree with much of what
Washington et al. (2018) have written exposing social justice and en-
vironmental justice, as commonly understood, as inadequate to the task
of protecting non-human nature and their efforts to expose anthro-
pocentrism masquerading as non-anthropocentrism. Indeed, they cite
us for not being sufficiently attuned to the interests of non-humans in
work we view as preparatory and setting the stage for the current article
(Treves et al., 2018), given our interpretivist approach. Nevertheless,
we still have reservations about their cursory treatment of what in-
dividual non-humans deserve from humans. When we read the crux of
their recommendations for reforming biodiversity conservation thought
and practice, they stated,
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“In particular, this assumes that populations, species and ecosystems
have an interest in existing, persisting, maintaining, and re-
generating their vital cycles, structures, functions and processes in
evolution. It implies that conservation is no longer a process be-
tween people and about nature, but between nature and people, and
justice has to be achieved between both.”
(p. 372, Washington et al., 2018)
This recommendation again seems to forget individual non-humans,
which outweighs the scattered references to individuals throughout
their text. We might view the above quotation as an oversight, but for
its position in their final recommendations and too many signals
throughout the paper suggesting they view collectives (populations,
species, habitats, ecosystems) as more important than individuals, de-
spite the latter being the actual selves (not objects) with claims: one
reason why we consider those collectives deserving of such a duty as
justice in the first place. Moreover, the consequences of failing to grant
equitable consideration to individual non-humans, as we do in the
current manuscript, is that their ecological justice will fall short once
again when individual non-human interests are subsumed in some no-
tion of the collective. This happens often (all the time?) in conservation,
because conflicts between individual humans and individual non-hu-
mans commonly face the rebuttal that ‘the collective is not jeopardized
by action x, so we can sacrifice the individual non-human for the
benefits of action x’. In that sense, our proposal argues instead for an
expansion of the concept of social justice, within which environmental
justice resides, to what is actually a multispecies society or, in Midgley's
(1998) words, a mixed-moral community, including the equitable dis-
tribution of resources among that community.
Our main concern is with multispecies justice, not simply its eco-
logical or environmental variants. These variants may just as likely
reinforce a false human-nature dichotomy by appearing in competition,
yet we would argue that they are intimately related. If we acknowledge
a mixed-moral community, social justice should have never excluded
the non-human world. As opposed to Washington et al., we would argue
the real risk comes from limiting the word ‘social’ to ‘human’, instead of
from disingenuously characterizing the rest of the non-human universe
as a human construct. Moreover, the use of terms like ‘ecological’ to
represent our obligations to the non-human world may seem limited
and inadequate when accounting for the habitual moral dismissal of
individual non-humans within the field of ecology as well as in popular
flavors of ecocentric axiologies pervasive in traditional conservation.
Concepts of ecojustice that peripheralize individual animals (human or
non-human) are not adequate, even if they are trying to establish right
relations (e.g.: bioproportionality) to the community of life. Our mixed-
moral community contains social and ecological relations, and we should
strive to do justice to both.
Similar dismissals of individual non-human animals may arise from
a focus on preserving evolutionary potential, a.k.a. “evocentrism”
(Sarrazin and Lecomte, 2016; Thomas, 2017). We note that evolu-
tionary considerations should certainly inform conservation, given the
deep interdependence between evolutionary processes and the well-
being of individuals and aggregate non-human nature. Yet we oppose
making the optimization of evolutionary potential, rather than the well-
being of community members, a primary criterion for determining our
ethical relationship to other selves because it can dismiss the well-being
of individual non-humans as long as a certain anthropogenic bench-
mark, such as genetic diversity, is maintained (e.g.: authorizing the
recreational killing of individuals in healthy populations). Rather, the
potential to adapt to future change is essential given its contribution to
non-human well-being. This reasoning applies to human individuals
and communities as well. Were evocentrism to be the master principle
of justice, it would be pernicious to those who are marginalized and
vulnerable.
Despite our concerns with these ecological and evolutionary argu-
ments, we favor complementary approaches to spheres of human and
non-human justice that seek to reinforce each other (Plumwood, 2000).
Thus, we argue our suggested ethical principles of geocentrism, equi-
table consideration, intergenerational equity and bioproportionality
strive to reinforce the moral, social, ecological, and evolutionary bonds
between humans and non-humans in perpetuity. We now proceed to
present preparatory proposals for a process for legal standing and au-
thentic representation for futurity (human and non-human).
5. Just preservation requires a just process
Proposals for the resolution of conservation conflicts often involve
multi-stakeholder consensus (López-Bao et al., 2017; Peterson et al.,
2005). Unless explicitly constituted to give equal voice to youth and
futurity, or other voiceless minorities, such processes are vulnerable to
capture by powerful, excessively narrow interests (Sax, 1970; Wood,
2014a,b) and unjust. Recent proposals suggest arbitration between two
opposed advocates representing interests in conservation and social
justice (Treves et al., 2017; Vucetich et al., 2018). We recommend the
equitable inclusion of currently unrepresented interests, because ad-
judication between parties representing only current human interests
would continue to disenfranchise non-humans, youth and future gen-
erations of all life (e.g., Young et al., 2016). Ours would be the most
grass-roots, pluralistic, and fair, contrary to claims otherwise (Pooley
and Redpath, 2018; Redpath et al., 2017) and their counter-proposals
that instead seem to argue for localism and might makes right pre-
ferences for current landowners. We also reject the possible rebuttal
that our reliance on judicial resolution of disputes is anti-democratic.
Rather, we embrace the long-held view that branches of democratic
governments must protect the constitutions of their democracies even
against majority will and thereby sometimes uphold counter-major-
itarian interests (Sax, 1980–1981), especially when the majority would
infringe the constitutional rights of minorities (Blumm and Wood,
2017).
Futurity always enjoys numerical majority over current adults. But
futurity is also a marginalized minority in electoral processes and may
sometimes be a special protected class in constitutions (Treves et al.,
2018), as arbitrated by the supreme courts of many nations (Blumm and
Wood, 2017). Our ideas about adjudication are but one of several
strategies for deliberative, representative processes (Dryzek, 2005;
Lynn, 2018). Whatever formula is chosen for decisions about the pre-
servation and use of nature, a just process must address authentic and
ethical representation, legal standing to advocate for the interests of
youth and futurity, and a legitimate authority to decide.
Authentic advocates for futurity who can speak in fair processes of
adjudication are a phenomenon not yet seen in modern jurisprudence,
to our knowledge. Although we grant, non-western courts have a head
start. We recommend that an advocate for human youth, human future
generations, and non-human life of all sorts be trained as a trustee for
charitable assets and held to the fiduciary standard of such trustees
(Treves et al., 2017). It may seem counter-intuitive to advocate against
instrumental uses of nature but advocate for trustees trained in chari-
table trusts which are instruments of commodification and translating
priceless legacies into other currencies. It is precisely for that reason,
we advocate for trustees and their other attributes. Trustees are trained
in the transparent, sophisticated accounting envisioned by Sax so long
ago for environmental trusts (Sax, 1970), as they are trained to convert
priceless heirlooms and priced legacies for their liquidation by some
beneficiaries (current users) and their preservation unchanged for other
beneficiaries (futurity). Also, fiduciary trustees are held to legal stan-
dards of selfless, incorruptible arbitration between beneficiaries with
multiple conflicting interests (Horner, 2000). However, the additional
attributes of nature's trustees for futurity will involve their ability to
understand ecology, ethics, and the manifold, complex, dynamic in-
teractions of humans and non-humans. Such trustees have never before
spoken in court on behalf of futurity of all life, as we envision.
Without such representation, we fear current human interests and
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the frail political systems of our day may forever cave to immediate
desires of insatiable human users without thinking seven generations
ahead as so many indigenous groups have done for so long. Without
granting futurity the same legal standing and authentic representation
as current interests, we predict we will see extinctions and atmospheric
contamination continue. Current adult human deliberations are easily
swayed by politicians and interest groups made wealthy and powerful
by exploiting nature (Blumm and Wood, 2017; Chapron et al., 2017;
Plater, 2004; Treves et al., 2017). Legitimate representatives of non-
humans and youth would be less credulous and more resistant to the
arguments of current adults, we predict. Also, we predict authentic
advocates for human youth, non-humans, and futurity would be more
preservationist as they eye what will be left to them by current human
adults, and scrutinize the validity and legitimacy of those claims more
than do current political processes. Legal standing for these advocates
can be expected to vary by jurisdiction and vary over time as societies
evolve multispecies ethics and codify laws at different rates.
The majority of national constitutions protect either rights to a
healthy environment or obligate governments to protect a healthy en-
vironment explicitly (Boyd, 2011; Treves et al., 2018). Implicit pro-
tections for rights to a healthy environment are also sometimes codified
in public trust doctrines that protect the environment as a permanent
trust, even if express national constitutional provisions do not do so;
public trust doctrines have been upheld by courts in many jurisdictions
that have declared these obligations on trustees (Blumm and Guthrie,
2012; Blumm and Paulsen, 2013; Blumm and Wood, 2017; Sand, 2004,
2014; Wood, 2014a,b). Furthermore, constitutions protect sovereign
rights of future citizens because they establish sovereign power itself;
we are not aware of any constitution that limits sovereignty to current
generations of citizens. Indeed, the U.S. provides an example of where
environmental protections are at best implicit in the Constitution, yet
public trust duties protect future generations. For example, the U.S.
Supreme Court in Illinois Central (1892) declared the perfect equality
of current and future legislatures. No legislature can reduce the powers
of a future one, lest the U.S. Constitution's protections for future citizens
be stolen by the present. The sovereign powers of the public were en-
trusted to the government and could not be abdicated or delegated.
With that duty to the broad public interest, the Supreme Court imposed
on all U.S. governments a public trust duty to preserve all components
of nature (Martin, 1842) from substantial impairment by use, contract,
grant, lease, or neglect (Illinois Central, 1892). The trust duty of U.S.
state and federal governments has been held as a constitutional guar-
antee at least in some states (Robinson Township, 2012) and is now
under consideration in federal court (Juliana, 2016). Other countries'
superior courts have also ruled in favor of youth and future generations,
often more clearly and powerfully than U.S. courts (Blumm and Wood,
2017).
We have not addressed the differing interests of youth, adults, fu-
ture generations, or humans versus non-humans. We assert that each of
these possessess its own ethical entitlements and could potentially have
conflicting interests. The interests of youth in an unimpaired atmo-
sphere have been discussed at length in legal scholarship (Blumm and
Wood, 2017) and in ethics literature (Davidson, 2008). Given our
present scope, we only point out that youth have some interest in use of
nature and some interest in preservation, yet also increasing concern for
non-human well-being (Bruskotter et al., 2018; Slagle et al., 2017),
which suggests they may side with current adults, non-humans or fu-
turity, depending on context. We predict this ‘swing vote’ will make
youth powerful if our vision is implemented but also subject to capture
by current adults. It is beyond our current scope to explore and predict
how that tension might be resolved in different scenarios. The legal
battles are complex and by no means settled, but the legal basis for our
recommendations about advocates for future generations of humans
rests on sound jurisprudence.
Advocacy for non-humans has a less clear path to legal standing in
courts. There is a unifying theme to advocating for future generations of
humans and non-humans. They are all voiceless and share an interest in
preserving the livability of the future planet. Although initially au-
thentic non-human representatives might be relegated to the same team
as representatives of future human generations by the legal code of a
given jurisdiction, independent legal standing is not far-fetched. On the
issue of non-human rights, we refer readers to recent philosophical,
political and legal literature that have developed robust proposals for
extending certain (i.e., inviolable or citizenship) rights to non-humans
(Kymlicka and Donaldson, 2011; Nussbaum, 2011, 2017) that demand
serious consideration. As for current wildlife law, legal standing for
wildlife has been reviewed for the U.S. (Favre, 2010). The latter author
found such representation minimal, but not expressly prohibited. For
example, the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Hughes v Oklahoma
(1979) struck down legal fictions off title, property, and ownership of
wild animals by individuals and states. Indeed, even the notion that
wildlife ‘belong’ to the sovereign U.S. public is a different sort of public
property. For example, Hughes v Oklahoma (1979) also affirmed,
“…the general rule we adopt in this case makes ample allowance for
preserving, in ways not inconsistent with the Commerce Clause, the
legitimate state concerns for conservation and protection of wild
animals underlying the 19th-century legal fiction of state owner-
ship… We consider the States' interests in conservation and pro-
tection of wild animals as legitimate local purposes similar to the
States' interests in protecting the health and safety of their citizens.”
(p. 335–337, Hughes v Oklahoma, 1979)
Likewise, the U.S. Supreme Courts in Martin (1842) and Illinois
Central (1892) variously noted the special character of the public trust
that we now call the environment or nature. Similarly, affirming that
protection of wildlife lay within the police powers of the State then and
in Lacoste v Department of Conservation (1924) suggests re-
presentatives for non-humans might petition the court for protection or
relief from police powers.
We anticipate criticism that U.S. environmental laws, especially
statutory and regulatory law, is a shabby example. We disavow any
celebration of the U.S. system of governance, given its decades of fail-
ures in environmental law (Blumm and Wood, 2017; Wood, 2014b).
Rather we hold up visionary constitutional provisions, common law, or
statutes from around the world (Blumm and Guthrie, 2012; Blumm and
Wood, 2017; Treves et al., 2018). For example, Rwanda's Constitution
Article 76 reserves seats in its highest legislative body, the Chamber of
Deputies, for “…twenty four (24) women… two (2) members elected by
the National Youth Council…one (1) member elected by the Federation
of the Associations of the Disabled.”, which nods to intergenerational
equity and historically disempowered groups in the political processes
often dominated by able men. Representatives of future human gen-
erations are now active in litigation in U.S. federal court in Juliana
(2016), so it seems time to articulate our view of the minimum, ne-
cessary attributes of such advocates for future humans. To some extent,
the same attributes should apply to authentic representatives of non-
humans.
First, the representatives of youth and futurity, human or non-
human, must adhere to a fiduciary standard of responsibility for the
components of the trust that is nature (for definitions of the duties of
fiduciary trustees, see Horner, 2000; Tobin, 1974). For this reason, a
trustee for futurity must advocate for almost pure preservation of life,
and even abiotic (non-living) components required for future uses.
Second, trustees of future generations cannot answer directly to futurity
or non-humans, because these are voiceless, therefore the trustees must
be particularly responsive to current criticisms and improvements
suggested from all quarters about how to perform their duties better.
Accountability of the trustees of futurity might even be higher than that
of the trustees of present-day, financial trusts, because the former will
never face all their beneficiaries so they should anticipate challenges
and self-criticize. We envision the highest standard of accountability,
which would marry the highest financial accountability with the
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highest standards of ethical and scientific integrity.
Scientific integrity has hallmarks of transparency, objectivity, and
reproducibility of all claims, which would be essential to a trustee of
futurity who must understand intimately the latest scientific evidence
about the environment and its uncertainties, particularly about nature
preservation and current uses of nature. Therefore, the authentic ad-
vocates for futurity must also be scientifically sophisticated trustees,
and surely deserve all of our wisdom.
Without perfect equality of representation for humans and non-
humans and for current life and futurity, the voiceless will always be
discounted and thereby lose most debates over use and preservation. In
sum, the process of multi-stakeholder arbitration in which most or all
participants represent non-anthropocentrism as envisioned by Vucetich
et al. (2018) would fail, we believe. It would fail because it still
prioritizes humans over non-humans, lacks intergenerational equity,
does not meet our criteria for authentic representation, does not con-
sider sovereign rights, and does not allow for the counter-majoritarian
authority of legitimate constitutional courts.
6. Practical recommendations for just preservation and
multispecies justice
We advocate several fundamental changes to how decisions are
made to preserve nature for futurity and use or allocate nature to
current adults. We do not propose that every decision be decided by a
separate court procedure. Each branch of government has a distinct
trustee duty, which when properly exercised could prevent endless
adjudication. But we do recommend that the differences between es-
sential human needs that might justify use (e.g., annual harvest of
timber or vital subsistence use of animals) be distinguished from the
trivial human needs that seem ascendant today (Santiago-Ávila et al.,
2018), and that non-human needs, including those of individuals, be
considered equitably alongside those. We do recommend that decisions
to preserve and use nature be subject to judicial decisions, not agency
fiat or sole executive authority, as is often the case today, especially in
the U.S. (Nie et al., 2017; Wood, 2014a,b). For example, the value
judgment that maximum sustainable yield is an appropriate goal for a
salmon population would never stand if grizzly bears, seals and sundry
other consumers of salmon (Levi et al., 2012) were considered in an
equitable manner. Yet, executive agencies in the U.S. and Canada ap-
pear to make such decisions routinely and then face costly, time-con-
suming, and bitter challenges on statutory and regulatory grounds
against standards of administrative procedures that bear little or no
relationship to trustee duties (Wood, 2014a,b). For decades, the en-
vironmental impact statements that U.S. regulatory agencies prepare or
accept from users have been criticized because they bear little re-
lationship to the best available science (Schindler, 1976), excuse trus-
tees from their duties (Wood, 2014b), or exist in a thick layer of pro-
tections against challenges by the sovereign citizens of many nations
(Blumm and Wood, 2017). That is why so many countries are seeing
constitutional challenges to government policies on climate change,
which is our generations' existential threat to humanity and all life on
Earth.
7. Conclusion
Very simply, our proposal embraces the entitlement of all life to
have a say in the globe-girdling exploits of current human adults.
Current human adults have a strong moral duty to consider the interests
of futurity and non-humans, at a minimum. Without strong non-an-
thropocentrism as we recommend, arguments for short-term profit-
eering from nature veiled by claims about poverty alleviation or eco-
nomic trickle-down will continue to persuade the audiences that are
dominated by current adults. We reject the criticism that our view is
‘the perfect standing in the way of the good’, because we propose a
more just slate of advocates debating in front of an authentic
constitutional power to protect the legitimate entitlements of non-hu-
mans and the sovereign rights of futurity in each jurisdiction.
The remedies we propose will not come easily. The usual complaints
of infeasibility and cost will surface, but we suggest that higher hurdles
have been overcome by nations abolishing slavery, adjudicating the
relationship of seceding states, weighing equal representation regard-
less of identity. The moral principles of non-anthropocentrism and in-
tergenerational equity demand the same moral convictions as those
pivotal issues for free societies and no less an investment of current
resources. Non-humans and future generations of human, let alone all,
life, so vastly outnumber current human adults that we are advocating
for the true grass-roots that spring to life each second worldwide.
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